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To the Pictou miners and their families whose lives have been taken or 
tragically altered in the area’s many mining disasters.
On the weekend that this volume of the U.N.B. L.J. went to press, regular 
radio programming in the Maritimes was frequently interrupted with news 
reports from Plymouth, N.S., near Stellarton, site of the Westray Coal Mine. In 
a methane explosion early on Saturday, May 9th, twenty-six miners were 
trapped underground. On Sunday, rescue workers recovered eleven bodies, and 
as I write, on Wednesday, May 13, volunteer rescue crews are separated from 
the work-site of the remaining fifteen by a solid wall of rock, coal and debris.
Westray, which went into production in late 1991, is the most recent 
attempt to mine the thick, gassy and very dangerous coal seams which twist and 
turn in fantastic convolutions, folds and faults deep beneath the surface in 
Pictou County. The mine is privately owned, by Curragh Resources Ltd, 
Toronto, but supported by millions of dollars in government loans and loan 
guarantees. The mine produces coal for the provincially-owned Nova Scotia 
Power Corporation, under a take-or-pay agreement which commits the 
corporation to purchase 700,000 tonnes of coal a year, and to pay for an 
additional 275,000 tonnes regardless of whether it is needed.
Smoke from coal-burning power plants is a major contributor to acid rain, 
yet requests for an environmental impact assessment hearing before the mine 
opened were brushed aside with glib assurances that Pictou coal was cleaner 
than coal from the federally-owned and state-supported Devco mines in Cape 
Breton, a direct competitor with Westray for the Power Corporation’s business. 
The Westray mine is situated in the riding that gave Prime Minister Mulroney 
his first seat in Parliament. When work began on opening the mine, the rifling 
was represented provincially by Conservative Don Cameron, now the Premier.
Persistent questions about safety conditions in the mine have also been 
brushed aside, even when raised in the provincial Legislature. The mine is not 
unionized; some unionists suggest that as part of its anti-unions efforts, the 
owners hired many workers who had limited coal mining experience. Despite 
the lack of alternative employment in the area, miners have quit because they 
believed that the mine was unsafe. Since the mine opened, there have been 
seven serious roof collapses, and repeated high methane readings.
There will undoubtedly be an inquiry into the Westray disaster. It will 
likely conclude, as have so many other Royal Commissions and Inquiries, that 
miners work in difficult conditions in the Pictou County coal field, producing, at 
great risk, coal of limited marketability. But to recognize the sacrifice made by 
the Westray miners and their families, the inquiry must also address regional 
underdevelopment that makes a community accept jobs at any price, and try to 
formulate strategies that put people ahead of profits or political advantage.
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Piet ou Towns are Tense As Mining T ie-U p Threatens (Halifax Herald 23 Feb 
1934).
Troubled Mine Areas Quiet After Hectic Saturday (Halifax Herald 5 March 1934)
Pickets and Mounties In Skirmish at Acadia Pit (Halifax Herald 23 May 1934)
Nova Scotia Miner Tells Thrilling Details of Fight Against Mine Bosses, Cops and 
AFL Leaders (Worker 2 June 1934)
Mounties Are Injured in Outbreak: Miners Hurled Into Pond By Huge Crowd at 
Pit’s Mouth (Halifax Herald 1 Aug 1934)
Eleven Miners Face High Court in Nova Scotia RCMP Trap After Strike (Worker
29 Aug 1934)
In Nova Scotia labour history, the words law, state and the coal industry bring to 
mind such headlines. Coal miners have a reputation for solidarity and militancy, 
born of the frequent work stoppages in the industry. In the Nova Scotia coalfields, 
difficult labour relations were exacerbated by the occupational hazards and high 
production costs of unusually deep and gassy mines, some of them extending miles 
under the ocean floor. Indeed, the history of the Nova Scotia coalfields is marked 
by long and bitter strikes, often involving competing unions. As early as 1864, the 
Nova Scotia government passed laws to restrain union militancy and provided 
troops and police to enable the coal operators to hire strikebreakers and continue 
production. But the state also contributed directly to capital accumulation, 
through granting leases of mining rights, establishing protective tariffs for coal and 
coke, and offering transportation subsidies so that Maritime coal producers could 
find and keep markets in central Canada. Since the coal belonged to the 
provincial Crown, the state had the power to supervise mining operations to 
ensure that the mining methods adopted by the mine operators did not destroy the 
potential of this valuable resource. Labour-management conflict would interfere 
with continued operations, possibly endangering the mines and certainly stopping 
the royalty payments collected by the provincial treasury on the coal produced; 
therefore, in intervening in labour relations, the state was looking to its own
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proprietary and pecuniary interests1.
Labour relations in the Nova Scotia coal industry, therefore, could not be left 
solely to the parties, with the government sending in troops or police only as a last 
resort when a dispute threatened public order. The use of force was an admission 
that the government had failed in its duty to see that the coal mines were operated 
effectively for the good of the whole province. In Nova Scotia, the government 
mediated disputes in the coal industry long before such practices were institu­
tionalized at the federal level with the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act2 
(IDIA). This legislation, passed in 1907, required employees and employers in 
transportation, public utilities and mining to submit their disputes to a board for 
investigation and conciliation prior to a strike or lock-out. Almost twenty years 
earlier, the Nova Scotia government had passed the Mines Arbitration Act, 1888, 
providing for the government and the parties to appoint a five-person arbitration 
panel with the power to issue binding decisions in labour disputes between coal 
workers and operators. The Mines Arbitration A ct did not become part of the 
practice of labour relations in the coal industry, but coal miners and the coal 
communities frequently turned to the government of the day for mediation 
services. When, in 1925, the Privy Council struck down the IDIA as an intrusion 
on provincial powers, Nova Scotia miners did not mourn its loss; experience had 
convinced them that for labour, the Act was a snare and a delusion. Instead, they 
returned to their older pattern of invoking the aid of politicians or of ad hoc 
commissions to force the coal companies to listen to their demands.3
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The work stoppages at the Acadia Coal Company in 1934 provide a focus for 
examining in detail the relationships among law makers, law enforcers and law 
consumers in the Nova Scotia coalfields. Amy Bartholomew and Susan Boyd, in 
“Toward A Political Economy of Law,” observe that despite law’s centrality in 
contemporary capitalist societies, “a political economy of law remains relatively 
unelaborated and untheorized in Canada.” While noting the existence of a body 
of work which examines “how particular structures and conflicts have influenced 
concrete areas of law as well as judicial and administrative decisions,” they lament 
a general failure to grapple with “theoretical consideration of complex questions” 
such as the relationship between legal rights and class power, or the extent to 
which the political economy determines the form and content of law and legal 
institutions in liberal democratic states. Bartholomew and Boyd are particularly 
critical of work which views both law and the state instrumentally: “as the 
unmediated will of a cohesive capitalist class.” Echoing E.P. Thompson, they insist 
that law must be recognized as an arena of class struggle, as well as struggle over 
issues of race and gender, and that law is ideological as well as instrumental. 
Finally, they demand that any discussion of Canadian law must take into account 
the specificity of the Canadian federal state and its resource-based economy, the 
cultural and ethnic diversity of its society, and the existence of competing legal 
systems and national identities within a single state. Nonetheless, the building 
blocks for such an imposing edifice must be accounts such as this one, which 
situate particular laws and legal decisions in the structures and conflicts of their 
time and place.4
The Acadia Coal Company, incorporated in 1865, was the principal coal mine 
operator in Pictou County, having taken over two of its competitors in a re­
organization in 1886. As with most of the major coal companies in the province, 
ownership and control of Acadia was in the hands of out-of-province financiers. 
The Acadia Company was originally organized by Hugh Allen of Montreal, the 
Pacific Scandal Allen, and some New York backers; in 1919, it became a 
subsidiary of the Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company (Scotia). In 1933, Acadia 
was forced into receivership when Scotia was unable to pay the interest on its 
debts. These debts included $1,703,000 owed to Acadia, $20,000 of which had 
been taken in cash on the day the receivership order was made. Scotia blamed its
frequent resort to conciliation boards and commissions “constituted, in our view, an abuse of 
conciliation machinery. Reliance upon outside persons and influence was developed to such an extent 
that both sides arranged themselves into two separate forces, and abandoned any attempt to see what 
was reasonable, in the contention of the other. Worse still, a policy of the kind within the industry 
was bound to lead to a game of tactics ... which would only result in a graver misunderstanding of 
each other.” (Duncan Commission 1925, supra, note 1 at 21-22.).
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financial difficulties on the lingering effects of its unhappy association with the 
British Empire Steel Corporation (BESCO), a huge mining, shipping and 
manufacturing conglomerate which had collapsed into bankruptcy in 1928, eight 
years after it was created. Scotia and Acadia survived as subsidiaries of the 
Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation (DOSCO), established to take over all of 
the BESCO properties.5
Acadia operated three mines in 1934 — the Vale mine in Thorburn, and the 
Allan and Albion mines in Stellarton, two small communities close to New 
Glasgow, Pictou County, on the Northumberland Strait. Because of the 
irregularity of the coal seams, mining conditions in Pictou were among the worst 
on the continent. The mines were deep and full of methane gas, making 
explosions and fires a daily menace. The softness and friability of the coal and the 
thickness of the coal seams made it difficult and costly to keep mine passageways 
open. Getting the coal to the surface and keeping the mines clear of gas and 
water required about one and one-third mine employees for every miner cutting 
coal at the face. Wages at the Acadia mines in 1936 contributed 60 to 62.5 per 
cent of production costs. With these operating conditions, Acadia had little hope 
of displacing American coal in the central Canadian market. Consequently, its 
main response to its financial crisis was to cut costs by reducing wages and closing 
mines. Both tactics met with resistance from the coal miners and their 
communities where Acadia was the major employer and taxpayer, particularly as 
Acadia’s relationship with Scotia provided ample evidence that the company was 
being bled white by irresponsible owners “from away.” But the receivers for the 
Acadia company also faced opposition from the provincial government, which 
obtained much of its revenue in the 1930s from coal royalties and fees for mining 
licences.6 The judiciary, too, initially opposed any decisions, such as abandoning 
a mine, that would destroy an existing asset and reduce the value of Acadia shares.
To further complicate the situation, two different unions claimed the right to 
speak for the Acadia workers, the Amalgamated Mine Workers of Nova Scotia
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(AMW) and the United Mine Workers of America (UMW). The union favoured 
by the company, and by the provincial government, was the UMW, an affiliate of 
the American Federation of Labour and its Canadian counterpart, the Trades and 
Labour Congress. In 1909-11, when the UMW first tried to obtain recognition as 
the union representing Nova Scotia miners, the coal companies and the provincial 
government joined in condemning this foreign threat to the satisfactory relation­
ship established with the once-militant Provincial Workmen’s Association (PWA). 
The local UMW was almost destroyed in recognition strikes in Cape Breton and 
Cumberland County, but, by 1917, it had sufficient strength that the federal 
government, in the interests of maintaining coal production for the war effort, 
arranged a merger between the two unions. By the end of the war, the UMW had 
emerged as the dominant party, and in 1919 won recognition in its own right from 
the principal coal companies.7
In the 1920s, the international executive of the UMW proved to the coal 
companies that it was worthy of their confidence by vetoing strikes while a 
collective agreement was in force, and discouraging participation in left-wing 
politics. The UMW’s reputation with employers and the government was further 
enhanced by the comparison with a new rival, the One Big Union (OBU), a 
syndicalist union organized in western Canada in 1919 and associated in the public 
mind with the Winnipeg General Strike. By 1926, the OBU claimed several Nova 
Scotia locals, including one in each of the Acadia coal communities. In what 
appears in retrospect as a dress rehearsal for the events of 1934, the Acadia Coal 
Company supported the UMW against its rival by granting a closed shop and the 
check-off, whereby union dues were deducted by the employer from each miner’s 
wages. The OBU challenged Acadia’s position in a lawsuit, but without success; 
the following year, it conceded defeat and withdrew its paid organizer.8
With the OBU out of the way, left-wing dissidents in the UMW mounted their 
own challenge to the less militant local leadership favoured by the union’s 
international executive. Their efforts met with little success until 1932, when the 
UMW lost considerable support through its refusal to finance a strike against wage 
cuts and mine closures. Frustrated and angry miners joined with left-wing 
organizers to establish a new union, which they called the Amalgamated Mine
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Workers of Nova Scotia. The name was chosen to evoke memories of the fighting  
spirit of the union created in 1917 with the merger of the PWA and the UMW. 
Many of the leaders of the AMW were Communists or Communist sympathizers, 
and in promoting the AMW, they were responding not only to events in Nova 
Scotia but also to policy directives from the Communist International (Comintern), 
the world-wide Communist organization established in 1919. Early in the 1920s, 
the Comintern had instructed Communist Party members to work within 
established unions, but in 1928, it abandoned its united front policy and practices 
in favour of creating its own organizations to compete directly with existing unions. 
The Canadian Communist Party (CP) accordingly formed the Workers’ Unity 
League in 1930. The Communists in the AMW did not press for affiliation, 
however, out of respect for the desire for local control, and the anti-Communist 
sentiment in Nova Scotia, particularly among the large number of Scottish Catholic 
miners. When the AMW returned to the UMW in 1936, Comintern policy was 
also a factor in the decision. The previous year, the Comintern had announced 
its “United Front Against Fascism and War,” and directed its members to join 
main-stream unions. But the decision to disband the AMW, like the decision to 
create it, was rooted in the realities of the Nova Scotia coal industry. The union’s 
experience, particularly the Acadia strike of 1934, convinced its supporters that an 
independent union could not survive against the combined opposition of the 
UMW, the coal companies and the state.9
The 1934 Acadia strike actually began with a lock-out on 6 November 1933, 
to enforce a 20 per cent wage cut announced by the Receiver for the company. 
Earnings were already at or below basic subsistence, both because most miners 
were unable to obtain a full week of work, and in part because of the previous 
year’s 20 per cent wage cut. When the men refused to accept a further reduction, 
the company closed its mines, retaining the services of the maintenance crews to 
avoid irreparable damage from accumulations of water or gas. The provincial 
government intervened with an offer to pay an outside expert to prepare a report 
on Acadia’s situation, if the company would re-open the mines at the old wage 
scale. Since the government also promised to cover any resulting deficit, Acadia 
re-opened the mines on 26 December 1933.10 In mid-February 1934, the 
government released the promised report, written by Thomas Graham, a mining 
engineer from Victoria, B.C. Graham confirmed the view of the Receiver- 
Liquidator that the Acadia mines would have to close if costs could not be
9Shields, supra, note 7 at 69-80; MacEwan, supra, note 6 at 158-64, 169-76; M. Earle, “The Coal 
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Party o f Canada (Toronto: Vanguard, 1981) at 276-9; I. Avakumovic, The Communist Party o f Canada, 
A History (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1975) at 68-76, 96-97, 131-32.
10Cameron, supra, note 4 at 156-57; Nova Scotia Journals, Part 1, Appendix 9, Annual Report on 
Mines 1934 (Halifax, 1935) at 56; Speech from the Throne, 1 March 1934.
reduced. He suggested three possible alternatives: operating all three mines with 
a wage reduction of 36 per cent for the lowest-paid workers; operating two mines 
with a wage reduction of 27 per cent; or operating one mine with a wage reduction 
of 16 per cent.11 When the government refused to offer any further aid to 
Acadia, the company announced that it would reduce wages forthwith, and 
appealed through the press for the miners’ co-operation, declaring that “[a]ny 
operation of the mines at this time would be, in fact, all for the benefit of the 
employees and produce nothing for the owners of the property.” Nonetheless, 
both the UMW and the AMW vowed to strike in defence of the existing wage 
rate.12
With the available records, we can only speculate that the UMW’s firm stand 
was due in part to the existence of the AMW, which had been declaring for some 
time that it would resist the wage cut. For its part, the AMW was in the position 
of having to match rhetoric with results. Since its creation in June 1932, the 
AMW had spread rapidly through the mining communities on Cape Breton. On 
the mainland, the new union was well supported in Stellarton, but won few 
members at Thorburn or at Springhill, in Cumberland County. In 1933, the AMW 
executive twice ignored strong membership calls for a district-wide strike, and, in 
the eyes of contemporary critics as well as its later chroniclers, “the AMW’s 
militance had been tested and failed the test;” the union may have seen the Acadia 
situation as an opportunity to refurbish its image. Both unions, of course, may 
have been hoping that the provincial government would offer money to Acadia in 
order to avoid a strike.13 Whatever the mix of motives, mine operations ceased 
on 28 February 1934, with miners from both unions refusing to go underground 
for the night shift. On 1 March 1934, a UMW committee attended a meeting with 
the four local mayors, and D.H. MacDougall, who had been appointed one of the 
receivers for Acadia. MacDougall, a consulting engineer, had twenty years of 
experience working for the DOSCO companies. At the meeting, he practically 
guaranteed three days of work per week, and promised that, for the next year, 
there would be no deductions from miners’ wages for arrears in rent or coal 
purchases. MacDougall also agreed to an independent audit of Acadia’s 
operations after six months if the UMW executive demanded it.14 Despite 
uncertainty about whether striking miners would be able to receive municipal 
relief, both unions rejected these terms, and the strike continued. About 1200
^ ‘Government Refuses to Aid Acadian Collieries”; “Miners Reject Pay Cuts Recommended by 
Graham Report”; “Claim Wider Markets, New Machines Would Solve Problems in Pictou Area” 
Halifax Herald (22 February 1934) 1.
12“Will Cut Mine Wages Forthwith”; “Pictou Towns Are Tense as Mining Tie-Up Threatens” Halifax 
Herald (23 February 1934).
13Earle, supra, note 8 at 120, 122-25.
14“Walk Out Closes Acadia Mines” Halifax Herald (1 March 1934) 1; Canadian Who’s Who 1936-37.
men were out of work; a maintenance crew of 150 remained at their posts.15 On 
3 March 1934, fighting between supporters of the rival unions was narrowly 
avoided when some UMW executive members from Cape Breton did not resist an 
AMW escort to the train station after the UMW tried to exclude non-members 
from a mass meeting. When the UMW executive members returned the following 
week, more than 100 RCMP officers had been moved to the area to maintain 
order, and there were no further incidents during this strike.16
Terms for ending the strike were negotiated at meetings in Halifax attended 
by representatives of the company, the UMW, and the government, including the 
Minister of Mines, and on one occasion at least, the Premier. In effect, the men 
accepted the proposed wage cut, but maintained an appearance of victory by 
describing the cut as a $100,000 “rebate” to Acadia, to be made up by each man 
working one-half shift without pay for the next year. This “rebate” was the 
miners’ contribution to the company’s $280,000 deficit from 1933. Acadia would 
not guarantee five days’ work per week, the issue on which negotiations had 
broken down at a mediation session with the government in mid-April.17
After acceptance of the terms by the Receiver at the beginning of May, the 
UMW submitted the terms to its members in a referendum. About two-thirds of 
the Acadia workforce voted; the settlement was accepted, 496 to 243, and the 
mines re-opened on 14 May.18 From the beginning of the strike, the AMW 
leaders were excluded from the negotiating process, and they condemned the 
proposed settlement as a sell-out. The president, John Alex MacDonald, declared 
his union’s willingness to assume the leadership of a general strike, but, following 
announcement of the results of the referendum, the local membership of the 
AMW returned to work.19
15“Miners to Meet on Saturday” Halifax Herald (2 March 1934) 1, 4.
16“Crowd Escorts Leaders”; “Troubled Mine Areas Quiet After Hectic Saturday” Halifax Herald ( 5 
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17“New Mines Conference is Arranged”; “Executive Has No New Proposals” Halifax Herald (31 
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A major reason for ending the strike was the fear of mine closures if it 
continued. Acadia estimated that it cost $7,000 per week to keep the mines free 
of water and gas, an expense it could not justify unless the mines were producing 
coal. A month into the strike, therefore, the Acadia Receivers applied to the 
Supreme Court of Nova Scotia for permission to abandon two of its three mines, 
by removing mining equipment and withdrawing the maintenance crews. Relying 
for its evidence on the Graham Report, the Receivers argued that closing two 
mines would result in a gross operating profit from the remaining mine of 19.7 
cents per ton, as compared to a loss of 17.1 cents per ton from operating two 
mines, and a loss of 36.5 cents per ton from operating all three mines. Six judges 
ruled on the application, which was unsuccessful. Two of them, Justices John 
Doull and R.H. Graham, were from Pictou County; both were former mayors of 
New Glasgow, and former MLAs for the County, Doull for the recently-defeated 
Conservatives and Graham for the Liberals. Indeed, Doull had been in Pictou and 
observed the send-off given the UMW leaders by the AMW in Stellarton on 3 
March. The two Pictou County judges, along with Justices H. Mellish and W.F. 
Carroll, denied the Receiver’s application, but invited them to apply again with 
better supporting evidence. Justice L. Hall, with Justice H. Ross concurring, 
would have granted the application. Three of the judges who denied the 
application referred to the fact that this matter came before them while the mines 
were idle due to a wage dispute; Graham also referred to the effect of mine 
closures on the local economy.20 On 9 April, the Receiver submitted a new 
application for abandonment of one mine, Acadia #  3 (the Vale mine), in 
Thorburn, supported by affidavits and oral testimony. This application was 
approved.21 The local mine manager was ordered to let the mine flood on 23 
April, but a delay was permitted when the UMW offered to re-open negotiations 
on the terms which the company finally accepted.22 At the conclusion of the 
strike, operations resumed at all three Acadia mines, although part of Acadia #  
3 was abandoned the next year.23
The provincial government, meanwhile, refused to subsidize higher wages or 
a guaranteed number of work shifts per week at Acadia, despite substantial 
government assistance to coal mines in Premier Angus L. Macdonald’s own riding
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^ “Flood Balks Mining” Halifax Herald (16 May 1935); “Deputy Minister’s Report on Thorburn Mine 
Tabled But Government Action Dormant” [New Glasgow] Evening News (16 May 1935).
of Inverness, Cape Breton. Macdonald explained that “[i]f every time an employer 
was forced to cut wages an appeal was made to the Government ... it was only a 
matter of time before the province would be in a worse position than Newfound­
land ... . It is impossible for the Government at this time to begin to make up to 
the employees the difference between what they think is a reasonable rate and 
what the industry can pay.”24 Towards the end of the negotiations, the 
government insisted that it had done enough in paying for the Graham Report and 
for maintaining the old wage rates until the Report was released. The government 
itself was one of Acadia’s largest creditors, for unpaid royalties, taxes, and workers’ 
compensation levies, with little prospect of payment. Nevertheless, the government 
did contribute to the final settlement with a $100,000 “donation” from an 
unidentified source.25
While the government was participating in the negotiating sessions, it was also 
proceeding with legislation to strengthen the UMW’s position. In 1927, as part of 
a general revision and consolidation of the provincial Coal Mines Regulation Act, 
union dues had been added to the items which an employer could lawfully deduct 
from a miners’ wages, if so requested in writing by the miner. The available 
evidence does not indicate any interest or concern about this particular amend­
ment, even though it came in the wake of the OBU’s unsuccessful attempt to 
obtain the dues check-off from the Acadia Company. During the 1934 Acadia 
strike, the government restricted rights under this section to the union representing 
the majority of the miners. Instead of a secret ballot to determine which union 
had the support of the majority, the amendment provided for an annual count of 
dues deduction request cards, to be signed by the miners and submitted to the 
employer. The card count was supervised by the employer and union representa­
tives, and in the absence of procedures for defining eligible voters, could include 
dues check-off cards signed by supervisory staff or others not eligible for union 
membership. The union with the most cards on each 15 November could then 
require the employer to check-off dues from each miner who supported that 
union. Winning the count, therefore, did not ensure that the company would 
recognize and bargain with the union having the support of the majority, only that 
that union could use the check-off to collect union dues from its supporters.
Former premier G.S. Harrington, now leader of the Conservative Opposition, 
was a lawyer who had on occasion represented the UMW, yet he strongly 
criticized the government’s bill. As Minister of Mines for the Conservatives, he
24“The Acadia Collieries in Pictou County Have Now Been Closed Down 28 Days” Halifax Herald (20
March 1934) 1.
had piloted the 1927 Coal Mines Regulation Act26 through the legislature. At the 
time, the UMW was regarded as the only union in the coal mines, and the 
government did not consider what rules should apply if two unions were competing 
for the checkoff. Nevertheless, Harrington argued that new legislation was 
unnecessary, because the coal companies were bound by their contracts with the 
UMW to check off dues for it exclusively. Harrington asserted that a unified trade 
union was essential to the coal industry in Nova Scotia, but he warned the 
government against using coercion to achieve unity, for “if there is one thing that 
labour is jealous of, it is the right to select its own union.” The amendment would 
lead to charges that the union that won the count did so only “by the grace of the 
company [and] there was no quicker way to kill unionized labour... Once the 
charge was made that a union had secured its check-off in that way, the men 
would no longer continue their membership in it. They would then make common 
cause with the union which had lost ... .” Harrington said that he had known the 
leaders of both unions for 25 years, but even with the prestige of the Premier’s 
office, he had been unable to persuade them to talk about unification. He 
suggested that if the government wanted to help, it should sponsor a referendum 
by secret ballot on the issue of union representation. Harrington’s arguments 
received support from two novice Liberal members from the coal mining areas, 
L.D. Currie (Cape Breton East), and D.F. Fraser (Pictou), as well as from 
Opposition members, but Minister of Mines Michael Dwyer responded that the 
coal companies had to know which union to negotiate with when existing contracts 
expired in November; the card-count method of determining that question met 
with the approval of the UMW, which had said that it would not participate in a 
referendum. The Premier also defended the bill, arguing that a referendum would 
amount to coercion but the card count did not, since 90 per cent of the workers 
already had submitted cards to the company requesting the check-off for one or 
the other of the competing unions. Besides, the company did not want a 
referendum. Despite opposition from the AMW, the bill passed third reading on
30 April. Its critics from among the Liberals voted with their party.27
™Coal Mines Regulation Act, S.N.S. 1927, c. 1, s. 97(1); S.N.S. 1934 c. 44. In contrast, the Rand 
formula, which is provided for in most modem collective bargaining statutes, gives the union 
representing the majority of the employees the right to demand the dues check-off from all employees,- 
regardless whether they support the union, since all employees benefit from the collective agreement 
and the services provided by the union.
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Through” Halifax Herald (28 April 1934) 1,4. Earle, supra, note 8 at 128. The 1925 Duncan Commis­
sion, supra, note 1 at 46, had condemned the check-off, except for expenses directly related to work: 
tools, gunpowder, each miner’s share of the wages of the checkweighman, and contributions for 
benefit societies and hospitals to which the company also contributed.
The UMW supported the amendment to the Coal Mines Regulation Act, but 
it did not sit back and wait for the card count in November. When the Acadia 
mines re-opened in May, after the strike, the UMW posted a notice at each pit­
head declaring the Acadia Coal Company mines to be a closed shop, and 
threatening a walk-out unless all AMW men joined the UMW. At the time, the 
UMW estimated that it had about 800 members in the two Acadia mines at 
Stellar ton, compared to 200 for the AMW. The Vale mine at Thorburn, which 
employed about 300, was estimated to be 100 per cent UMW. Vowing to stand 
firm and defend their rights under the Coal Mines Regulation Act, the majority of 
the AMW members refused to apply for membership in the UMW. The Acadia 
Company then stopped the lamps of non-UMW members, thereby averting the 
threatened UMW strike by locking out the AMW. One Acadia mine was able to 
continue operations with UMW men; the other two were shut down. With no 
possibility of obtaining municipal relief, a few AMW men went back to the UMW, 
but on 20 May the remaining AMW supporters organized a picket line outside the 
Acadia mines. Mounted Police were rushed in from neighbouring communities, 
and over the next three days, there were several skirmishes involving the police, 
picketing miners, their wives and daughters and UMW members. A police officer 
was hit in the head with a stone, and the local UMW President had to fire a 
revolver over people’s heads to disperse a crowd that was throwing stones at his 
house. There were, however, no serious injuries and no charges laid. Operations 
resumed in all three mines when the UMW local rescinded its earlier decision to 
try and impose the closed shop.28
Their success in ending the May lock-out was a welcome victory for AMW 
supporters in Pictou County, and they attempted to reinforce it in the courts. J.W. 
Porter, an AMW member, charged the Acadia Company with breaching the 
requirement in the Coal Mines Regulation A ct that a company check off union 
dues on receipt of a written request to that effect from an employee. Acadia was 
honouring requests from UMW members for the check-off, but not from AMW 
members. In a hearing in magistrate’s court, the lawyer for Acadia argued that 
the AMW was not entitled to the dues check-off because it was a political organiz­
ation, not a bona fide miners’ union; its constitution stated its purpose as, among 
other things, changing the economic system of the country. Late in July, the case 
was adjourned at the request of the lawyer for the AMW to permit each side to 
present written arguments. Ultimately, the magistrate decided in favour of the
^ “Notices Posted at Pits” Halifax Herald (18 May 1934) 1, 4; Halifax Herald (21 May 1934) 1, 4; 
“Miners March to Demand Relief’ Halifax Herald (22 May 1934) 3; “Delegation Asks Council 
Intentions About Relief’ Halifax Herald (23 May 1934) 3; “Pickets and Mounties in Skirmish at 
Acadia Pit” Halifax Herald (23 May 1934) 1; “Peace Follows Tumult at Stellerton Colliery” Halifax 
Herald (24 May 1934) 1,4; “UMW Rescinds Order for Mine Closed Shop” Halifax Herald (24 May 
1934) 4; “Peace Prevails in Pictou,” “Union Men Will Work Together,” “Company to Accept AMW 
Cards When Pits Operate Today” Halifax Herald (25 May 1934) 3; Cameron, supra, note 4 at 159-160.
AMW, giving it the right to participate in the 15 November card count.29
Meanwhile, there was another short but violent strike at the Albion and Allan 
mines in Stellarton. On 26 July 1934, a miner named William MacPherson 
complained to the manager of the Allan mine about the condition of his company- 
owned house, and was suspended for using abusive language. The afternoon shift 
walked out that day in protest, but the company refused to discuss the matter until 
the men returned to work. The strike spread to the Albion mine, although at both 
mines some men continued to work.30 On 31 July, pent-up frustration over the 
wage cut and tension between the rival unions erupted into what a newspaper 
report described as “terror.” A mob of angry men and women waited at the Allan 
mine for men coming off their shift, and kept them imprisoned in the wash house 
with a fusillade of stones until the police came to their rescue. The following day, 
a crowd of 300, including women and children, administered a “ceremonial 
christening” in the mine pond to 12 miners coming off the afternoon shift at the 
Albion mine. That evening, a company barn was burned. Stellarton was peaceful 
the next evening, perhaps because many of the strike supporters had travelled to 
Thorburn to address a public meeting, attended by about 100 people; the UMW 
loyalists in Thorburn gave a “definite and decided no” to the call for a sympathy 
strike. Inter-union conflict was not ostensibly the issue in the strike, but was 
identified as a factor by officials of the company and by the UMW. In his year- 
end report to the Supreme Court, one of the Acadia receivers attributed the strike 
to the dismissal of a worker for insolence, and “a feeling between the United Mine 
Workers and the Amalgamated Mine Workers as to the check-off system.”31 The 
local UMW board member denounced the walk-out as being “due to agitators who 
were receiving their backing from other parts of the province.”32
On 3 August, at a meeting open only to working miners, the men voted 
unanimously to return to work, much to the relief of William MacPherson. The 
RCMP then laid charges of unlawful assembly against eleven men involved in the 
“christening” incident; four of them had not been called back to work after the 
strike ended in May, and one had not worked at Acadia for over two years. No 
women were charged, despite their active participation in the rowdiness. The 
Communist-sponsored Canadian Labour Defense League raised money to pay for 
a lawyer for the accused, and hired G.H. Vernon of Truro, who had represented
^ “Test Case of AMW Adjourned” Halifax Herald (1 August 1934) 3; Cameron, supra, note 4 at 162.
^Cameron, supra, note 4 at 160-161; “Shaft Closed” Halifax Herald (28 July 1934) 1, 7; “Pictou 
County Mine Tie-up Continues” Halifax Herald (30 July 1934) 3; “Pictou County Mines Idle as 
Picketers Surround Pit” Halifax Herald (31 July 1934) 3; “Mounties Are Injured in Outbreak” Halifax 
Herald (1 August 1934) 1, 4; “Anxiety Grips Coal Fields” Halifax Herald (2 August 1934) 1, 4.
31Public Archives of Nova Scotia (PANS), RG 39 C v. 827, 1933 S.C. 4668, Affidavit of F.H.M. Jones,
11 Dec 1934; Halifax Herald (3 August 1934).
32“Miners to Sit Today” Halifax Herald (3 August 1934) 1, 4.
the AMW in the attempt to force the Acadia Company to honour its members’ 
check-off requests. The trials were held early in November; when the first three 
were convicted, the rest pleaded guilty. Sentences ranged from 2 to 5 months.33
The final blow to the AMW was the card count. The results showed that 
Nova Scotia’s 12,000 miners were fairly evenly divided between the AMW and 
UMW with the AMW having a slight lead. Rights to the check-off were 
determined on the overall totals for each company, however, rather than on a 
mine-by-mine basis. So, despite the AMW success in Glace Bay, the UMW won 
the right to the dues checkoff in all the DOSCO mines. The AMW won only in 
the Scotia mines in Cape Breton. In Pictou, the UMW received 641 cards, and 
the AMW 549. Amidst allegations of sharp practices and outright cheating, 
observers concluded that the card count, instead of resolving the dual union 
question, had only aggravated it. Although the AMW vowed to carry on by 
collecting its dues over the table — a practice which it had initially advocated as 
ensuring union democracy and rank-and-file control — it was unable to make any 
gains in the card count the following year. Early in 1936, after fruitless meetings 
between the leaders of the two unions, rank-and-file AMW miners initiated 
unification talks from which union officials were explicitly excluded. The talks 
were successful; the AMW was dissolved and its members admitted to the UMW 
without initiation fees and with full rights. Many AMW leaders subsequently were 
elected to local executive positions in the UMW. The UMW’s dominance in Nova 
Scotia was not challenged again until 1985, when a union affiliated with the 
nationalist Council of Canadian Unions lost a representation vote.34
Despite the obvious defects of the procedure for establishing the right to the 
dues check-off, coal mine employees who were covered by the 1934 legislation 
were excluded from the more elaborate dues check-off provisions contained in the 
Trade Union A ct which Nova Scotia passed in 1937. The first Canadian 
jurisdiction to introduce legislation loosely modelled on the compulsory collective 
bargaining provisions of the American Wagner Act, passed in 1935, Nova Scotia 
proceeded cautiously; the exclusion of coal mine employees from the dues check­
off section was probably to their advantage. The Act provided that employers who 
refused to recognize and bargain collectively with the trade union supported by the 
majority of their employees were liable to a fine of $100 or imprisonment for 
thirty days in default of payment. Enforcement was left up to the labour 
movement. The legislation did not provide for a secret ballot to determine which 
union had the majority support of the employees. In any industry in which
33“Men to Return To Pits” Halifax Herald (4 August 1934) 1; “Miners Are Sentenced At Pictou” 
Halifax Herald (2 November 1934) 3; “Eleven Miners Face High Court in Nova Scotia RC.M.P. Trap 
After Strike” The Worker (29 August 1934); Cameron, supra, note 4 at 161.
^Earle, supra, note 8 at 128, 131, 135, 136; “UMW Gains Control of Mine Labor in Six Companies” 
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employers already made deductions from their employees’ wages by statute or by 
arrangement between employer and employees, the legislation required employers 
to include deductions for union dues at the request in writing of the individual 
employee, if such deductions had been approved by a majority of the employees 
in a vote by ballot conducted by the Minister of Labour. For unions which had 
been able to negotiate a dues check-off, this cumbersome procedure was a step 
backward, especially as it required individual union supporters to identify 
themselves to management.35
In contract negotiations in 1935, Acadia miners received a five per cent wage 
increase, but rates remained substantially below those paid at the other DOSCO 
mines. Another strike at Acadia in 1937 ended when the government promised 
to appoint yet another Royal Commission, chaired by Justice W.F. Carroll. Like 
its predecessors, it concluded that the Acadia Company was not in a financial 
position to pay higher wages. Acadia’s parent company, Nova Scotia Steel and 
Coal, was discharged from receivership in 1938, and operated as a holding 
company thereafter. Acadia continued operating at least one mine in the New 
Glasgow area until 1968, and surrendered its charter of incorporation the following 
year. Some of Acadia’s operations were taken over by the Pictou County 
Research and Development Commission (Picord), but even government subsidies 
did not enable the company to find markets for its coal, and the last of the Acadia 
mines was closed in 1972.36
What does this small snippet of the history of the Nova Scotia coal fields tell 
us about law and the state? First, it reminds us that neither the state nor law are 
monolithic; different agencies within the state, including different legal institutions, 
play different and sometimes contradictory roles. The net effect, however, was to 
strengthen the power of the Acadia Coal Company and the union with which it 
was prepared to negotiate, and to reduce the viability of a more militant or radical 
alternative. Acting through the Legislature, the state regulated union entitlement 
to the check-off, a right that was recognized by the miners and the government as 
being essential to a union’s survival.37 Using the persuasive power of the 
Executive -  the Minister of Mines, the Premier and at times the whole Cabinet 
-  bolstered by reports of outside experts, the state pressured the miners to accept 
the company’s terms, and privately offered to spend taxpayers’ money to help the 
UMW save face. The government hoped, in keeping its offer quiet, to preserve 
its image as a neutral mediator, helping to resolve what was characterized as a 
dispute merely over wages. The image of the state as neutral mediator was
35Trade Union Act, S.N.S. 1937, c.6.
^Report on Acadia, supra, note 4 at 18-20; Monetary Times (19 March 1978) 301-04; (23 July 1938)
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tarnished when the police rushed into the New Glasgow area at the first hint of 
trouble. But the government could distance itself from the police. Indeed, the 
trials of the men charged with unlawful assembly helped to restore the image of 
the neutral state; in the trial process, collective acts of protest against the arbitrary 
power of the company were reconstructed into random acts of violence against 
other miners. The state, in convicting the trouble-makers, was acting to protect 
every individual’s interest in personal security. The image of the neutral state was 
enhanced, too, by the Supreme Court judges who delayed implementation of the 
Receiver’s plan to close down one of the Acadia mines, as well as by the 
magistrate who agreed with the contention of the AMW that under the 1927 Coal 
Mines Regulation Act, Acadia was obliged to check off union dues for the AMW 
at the written request of an employee. Both these decisions, at least in the very 
short-term, went against the express wishes of the Receiver for the Acadia 
Company, and limited some of his freedom to deal with the company’s property 
and employees as he saw fit.
Nonetheless, ultimately law supported the status quo. The check-off legislation 
was passed despite the opposition of the AMW, and police and courts were used 
to limit picketing and protests. Law emerged as force clothed with legitimacy 
because it was backed by the authority of the state: as such it was deployed to 
suppress labour unrest and ensure continued coal production. Such an 
instrumentalist understanding of law, however, ignores both the relative autonomy 
of the state from the immediate direction of the capitalist class, and the relative 
autonomy of law and legal institutions within the liberal democratic state. In 
deciding how to respond to the strike at Acadia, the Nova Scotia government had 
to consider a great deal more than the needs of the capitalists who were in danger 
of losing their investment in the Acadia Coal Company. The government was 
concerned that commitments made to settle the Acadia strike or to prevent the 
company from closing any of its mines would evoke demands for equivalent 
treatment from other mining areas. And given Acadia’s relationship to DOSCO, 
the government could not be sure that the company would not be wound up 
anyway, once its assets had been stripped to support other companies in the 
conglomerate. But if the strike continued, or mines were closed, the provincial 
treasury could never recover the money owed it by Acadia, and the municipalities 
around the mines would be so devastated that the province would have to step in 
with money for relief payments and industrial re-development. The judiciary, too, 
imbued with its own professional ethic as well as a keen understanding of the 
political economy of the coalfields, based its decision on more than the immediate 
needs of the Receiver. The judicial decisions on the mine closing and the check­
off show that law can be used by the less powerful to impose some limits, if only 
briefly, on the power arrayed against them. Of course, these victories, tenuous as 
they are, serve as well to reinforce faith in the liberal ideal of equality before the 
law.
The events surrounding the Acadia strike of 1934 reveal the limitations of 
instrumentalism as a way of understanding how law works in a capitalist society.
They reveal, as well, the limitations of the economists’ model of the free market, 
in which supply and demand determine price, and profitability determines the level 
of investment. Markets operate within the framework created by law. At the 
most basic level, buying and selling are possible only because the state uses law to 
define and protect the rights of property owners. But in the Nova Scotia coal 
industry, the state did much more-defining the terms of coal leases, providing cash 
grants to coal mine operators, distributing purchasing orders for coal for the state- 
owned Canadian National Railways on the basis of political considerations, 
enacting regulations for the safe working of the mines and supplying inspectors to 
see that the regulations were followed, intervening in labour disputes as mediators 
and keepers of the peace, and, while maintaining the appearance of neutrality on 
the issue of union representation, intervening decisively with legislation which gave 
an advantage to the UMW, once it had proved that it would co-operate with 
management and the state in containing left-wing radicalism or labour militance.38
One would be foolhardy to advance a new paradigm for the law/state/econo- 
my relationship on the basis of a single case study, but the empirical evidence does 
point to the need to elaborate a carefully nuanced theory of this relationship. 
Such a theory must begin with the recognition that, although the state uses law to 
promote capital accumulation and to create and maintain social harmony, it does 
so within the structural constraints of a capitalist society and the ideological limits 
imposed by notions of fundamental legal rights. By threatening to strike and move 
its investment elsewhere, capital can exert considerable pressure on the state to 
provide it with the legal regime which is most conducive to capital accumulation. 
But in a liberal democratic state, law is never simply the expression of the interests 
of the dominant class. Intra-class friction and division is too prevalent for the 
state to be able to reconcile all the conflicting demands of financiers, 
entrepreneurs, managers, importers, exporters, shippers, carriers, resource 
extractors, manufacturers and the myriad other economic sectors which make up 
the modern capitalist class. Nor is the state itself monolithic, and able to speak 
with one voice, even if it had the information and analytic ability to determine 
what the message should be. Furthermore, if the state is to maintain its 
legitimacy, it must ensure that its laws and its actions conform to the rule of law. 
It must appear to be neutral and impartial, and to be bound by its own rules. The 
rule of law, however, involves more than appearances. In some conjunctures, 
members of the subordinate class are able to employ the rule of law, with its
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promise of juridical equality to all, to limit the prerogatives of power.39 Yet 
juridical equality can often hide substantive inequality. To quote again the familiar 
words of Anatole France, “The law in its majestic equality forbids both the rich 
as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal 
bread.” In the end, although Acadia and the union representatives both had 
access to the courts, Acadia’s perspective dominated; arguments based on a moral 
economy did not withstand the company’s legal and financial resources and its 
control over information about costs of production and profits. By framing 
disputes in the language of contract and property rights, law obscures fundamental 
questions about differential access to resources of all kinds, including influence on 
decision-making.
In the Pictou County coal mines in 1934, Acadia needed state assistance to 
survive, but the state also needed Acadia, and so had to provide it with the legal 
support it requested. Of course, the state had to ensure that the legal regime had 
some legitimacy in the eyes of the workers; the frequent resort to commissions of 
inquiry was one way to persuade striking workers that company decisions upheld 
by the government were based on sound economic grounds. If doubts remained, 
consent could be coerced. The need to earn money for basic subsistence was a 
very powerful incentive to return to work on the company’s terms; the presence 
in the community of a large body of police served to remind the striking miners 
that they had no property rights in their jobs — on the contrary, the law would 
protect the right of the company to hire others in their place. Although on some 
occasions workers were able to invoke the law in their behalf, law, like the state, 
operated from within a capitalist structure in which power and property rights 
were not equally available to all.
^For a critique of this argument, see M. J. Horwitz, “The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human 
Good?” (1977) 86 Yale Law Journal 561, reviewing D. Hay et al., Albion’s Fatal Tree: Crime and 
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